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Income Inequality: Implications 
and Relevant Economic Policies 
 
Summary: The aim of this contribution is to discuss closely the implications of
income inequality and the economic policies to tackle it, especially so in view of
inequality being one of the main causes of the 2007/2008 international financial
crisis and the “great recession” that subsequently emerged. Wealth inequality
is also important in this respect, but the focus is on income inequality. Ever
since the financial crisis and the subsequent “great recession”, inequality of
income, and wealth, has increased and the demand for economic policy initia-
tives to produce a more equal distribution of income and wealth has become 
more urgent. Such reduction would help to increase the level of economic
activity as has been demonstrated again more recently. A number of economic
policy initiatives for this purpose will be the focus of this contribution. 
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We deal in this contribution with inequality of income around the world, which has 
become especially serious over the last thirty years or so, emphasising particular 
problems in individual countries as necessary. There has been a substantial decline in 
wage shares across the world with broader changes in income distribution. Relevant 
statistics on wages are provided in The Economist (2015), where it is reported that in 
the US case real wages in 2014 were 1.2 percent below what they were in 2009; in 
the UK and in 2014 median pay was 10 percent below its 2008 high; and in Germany 
wages were still 2.4 percent below their 2008 level (see, also, International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) 2008; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) 2011). 
Indeed, distribution of income has become more polarised in the OECD coun-
tries (OECD 2008, 2011; see also, Danilo Šuković 2014), with the top income groups 
increasing their shares substantially, especially the financial sector group (Philip 
Arestis and Elias Karakitsos 2013); and particularly so in the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
especially in the US (Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez 
2011). Real wage growth has lagged behind productivity growth since the 1980s in 
the advanced economies and since the 1990s in developing and emerging economies 
(Engelbert Stockhammer 2013). Joseph E. Stiglitz (2015) suggests that inequality is 
counterproductive for the general health of the economy. 
Inequality of wealth is also an important and relevant issue, which, however, 
needs a separate contribution to be dealt with satisfactorily. It is also the case that 
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“personal distribution of wealth (both capital and land) is less available on an inter-
nationally comparable basis than in the case of income” (Atkinson 2015, p. 71). We 
refer to it, nonetheless, in what follows when it is necessary. The focus of this contri-
bution, though, is on the economic policies to reduce income inequalities. This is a 
particularly important aspect in view of the extraordinary increase in inequality, es-
pecially so prior to the international financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the “great re-
cession” that followed it. In fact the increase in inequality started from the 1980s 
(see, for example, Atkinson 2015, Chapter 2); a period of inequality that has been 
labelled as the “great inequality” era (Michael D. Yates 2012; see also John B. Foster 
and Yates 2014). 
We begin with a short discussion of the implications of income inequality, and 
of the importance of tackling inequalities in Section 1. In Section 2 we turn our atten-
tion to the economic policies to contain inequality, the main focus of this contribu-
tion. We summarise and conclude in Section 3.  
 
1. Inequality and Implications 
 
A number of contributors have suggested that the steady but sharp rise in inequality, 
especially in the US and the UK, but elsewhere, too, is an important feature of the 
2007/2008 international financial crisis and the “great recession” that followed. John 
K. Galbraith (2012, p. 4) suggests that “inequality was the heart of the financial cri-
sis. The crisis was about the terms of credit between the wealthy and everyone else, 
as mediated by mortgage companies, banks, ratings agencies, investment banks, gov-
ernment sponsored enterprises, and the derivatives markets”. In the US “the top 1 
percent of households accounted for only 8.9 percent of income in 1976, but this 
share grew to 23.5 percent of the total income generated in the United States by 
2007” (Raghuram G. Rajan 2010, p. 8). Further evidence by Piketty (2014) shows 
that between 1914 and the 1970s income inequality and the stock of wealth in the US 
fell dramatically. Since the 1970s, however, both income inequality and the stock of 
wealth have risen back to the pre-1914 norms. In the past 30 years or so, and as Pi-
ketty (op. cit.) shows, in the US nearly 75 percent of the aggregate income growth 
has gone to the top of the distribution. And since 1980, “income inequality has ex-
ploded in the United States. The upper decile’s share increased from 30-35 percent of 
national income in the 1970s to 40-45 in the 2000s - an increase of 15 points of na-
tional income” (Piketty 2014, p. 294). Piketty (2014) deals with the issue of growing 
inequality in a statistical sense “without explicitly addressing either the roots of this 
or the question of growing class power” (Foster and Yates 2014, p. 13). Robert Wade 
(2012, p. 12) suggests that “the richest 1 percent of American households owned 
about 35 percent of national wealth in 2006-2007 ... a far greater share than in most 
other developed countries”. Evidence produced by Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 
(2011) also shows that the share of US total income going to top income groups had 
risen dramatically prior to 2007. The top pre-tax decile income share reached almost 
50% by 2007, the highest level on record. The share of an even wealthier group - the 
top 0.1% - more than quadrupled from 2.6% to 12.3% over the period 1976 to 2007. 
Atkinson (1997) shows that for the UK in the 1980s an “unparalleled” rise in the UK 
inequality occurred. Also, according to Stiglitz (2013), and by the August 2007 
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emergence of the international financial crisis, the top 0.1 percent of US households 
had an income, which was 220 times larger than the average of the bottom 90 per-
cent. Real wages had lagged even behind productivity well before the onset of the 
“great recession” (we may note that in the US wages constitute the most important 
component of incomes).  
Available data in 51 out of 73 countries around the world, reported in the ILO 
(2008, p. 1) study, “show that the share of wages in total income declined over the 
past two decades. The largest decline in the share of wages in GDP took place in Lat-
in America and the Caribbean (-13 points), followed by Asia and the Pacific (-10 
points) and the Advanced Economies (-9)”. Eckhard Hein and Matthias Mundt 
(2012) show that in the G20 developed economies, and since the early 1980s, a fall-
ing trend of the wage share clearly materialised. In the same contribution, Hein and 
Mundt (op. cit.) examine a group of emerging G20 countries, which also experienced 
an overall falling trend of the wage share with the exception of India (the original 
data utilised can be found in Özlem Onaran and Giorgos Galanis 2013). Another re-
levant characteristic of the period 1983 to 2007 was that the ratio of household debt 
to GDP in the US, among lower- and middle-income households, increased dramati-
cally: it doubled from 49.1% in 1983 to 98.0% in 2007 (see Michael Kumhof and 
Romain Rencière 2010a, b; Kumhof, Rencière, and Pablo Winant 2015, for further 
details). In terms of the “great depression”, Kumhof, Rencière, and Winant (2015) 
provide relevant US data that suggest that between 1920 and 1928 the ratio of house-
hold debt to GDP, among lower- and middle-income households, more than doubled 
from 16.9% to 37.1%.  
Such household debt levels did support aggregate demand and employment 
but were clearly unsustainable. Kumhof, Rencière, and Winant (2015) investigate the 
impact of inequality and debt, within a theoretical framework and an empirical me-
thodology (utilising US stylised facts) along with calibrations, as well as comparing 
the “great depression” of 1929 and the “great recession” of 2007. They suggest that 
“a striking and often overlooked similarity between these two crises is that both were 
preceded, over a period of decades, by a sharp increase in income inequality, and by 
a similarly sharp increase in debt-to-income ratios among lower- and middle-income 
households. When debt levels started to be perceived as unsustainable, they contri-
buted to triggering exceptionally deep financial and real crises” (Kumhof, Rencière, 
and Winant 2015, p. 1217). It is the case that the increase in the US household debt 
over the period 1983-2007 contributed substantially to the increase in the GDP share 
of the US financial sector (Thomas Philippon 2013; Kumhof, Rencière, and Winant 
2015). The increase was from 5.5% to 7.9% between 1983 and 2007. A similar in-
crease also took place in the US before the “great depression”, where the increase 
was from 2.8% in the early 1920s to 4.6% by 1928. The theoretical model proposed 
in the Kumhof, Rencière, and Winant (2015) study is a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model, with two groups of households, investors (the top 5% of 
the households) and workers (the bottom 95% of households). This model links 
“greater income inequality”, generated endogenously, with increased debt-to-income 
ratio that generates financial fragility, and eventually the risk of a financial crisis is 
increasingly enhanced. The mechanism in the context of financial fragility is that the 
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crisis is characterised by household defaults, which lead to abrupt output contraction. 
This is consistent with the results of the study by Philippon and Virgiliu Midrigan 
(2011) in terms of explaining the “great recession”. 
Their calibrations support the theoretical model proposed. A study by Kumhof 
et al. (2012) examines inequality and balance of payments by studying the interac-
tions between two types of agents that represent the top 5% and the bottom 95% of 
the income distribution. This study is based on Kumhof and Rencière (2010a) but in 
the case of an open economy. They conclude that in the case of developed econo-
mies, inequality results in the poor and middle class, the 95 percent, borrowing from 
the rich, so that their consumption does not decrease as much as their income; at the 
same time, consumption of the rich, the 5 percent, increases. The net effect is an in-
crease in domestic demand and therefore a current account deficit. In the case of 
emerging economies the fact that poor and middle class households cannot increase 
their borrowing to finance consumption, a surplus in the balance of payments pre-
vails. Another study by Kumhof, Rencière, and Winant (2013, p. 1243) investigates 
the possible impact of reducing the income inequality post 1983 over a period of ten 
years to conclude that “this would lead to a sustained reduction in leverage that 
would significantly reduce the probability of further crises”. 
Jess Bailey, Joe Coward, and Matthew Whittaker (2011) examine the relation-
ship between median pay and per capita GDP growth over the period prior to the 
great recession to conclude that it weakened in the ten advanced countries examined. 
Three groups are identified where the median pay grew significantly less quickly 
than output per person in all of the ten countries considered with different degrees as 
follows: chronic (US, Australia, Canada), acute (France, UK, Germany) and mild 
(Japan, Finland, Sweden, Denmark). 
The declining wage, and rising profit share, were compounded by the increas-
ing concentration of earnings at the top, especially in the financial sector; and as 
Galbraith (2012) has shown, countries with larger financial sectors have more in-
equality. This has been the case not just in the US but also in the rest of the world 
(see, for example, Arestis and Karakitsos 2013). In the US the share of the financial 
sector to GDP almost doubled in size between 1981 and 2007, and more recently 
accounted for 8% of US GDP (Philippon 2008). Between 1981 and 2007 the US fi-
nancial sector as measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP grew from 90% to 
210%. Also, a sharp, nearly six-fold increase occurred in their profitability since 
1982. Indeed, and over the same period, wages in the financial sector were higher 
than in other sectors, even after controlling for education. Financial sector relative 
wages, and the ratio of the wage bill in the financial sector to its full-time-equivalent 
employment share, enjoyed a steep increase over the period mid-1980s to 2006 (Phi-
lippon and Ariell Reshef 2009). 
Similar but less pronounced trends in the financial sector are relevant in many 
other countries. Germany, China and the UK are three examples but many more can 
be cited, including emerging countries. In Germany, for example, and according to 
the OECD (2008), income inequality over the years 2000 to 2005 grew faster than in 
any other OECD country. In China the top 1% income share gradually increased 
from 2.6% in 1986 to 5.9% in 2003. Also in China financial intermediary shares to 
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GDP rose from 1.6% in 1980 to 5.4% in 2008 (Alan Greenspan 2010, p. 15). The 
then Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority made the point in the case of 
the UK: “there has been a sharp rise in income differential between many employees 
in the financial sector and average incomes across the whole of the economy” (Adair 
Turner 2010).  
Table 1 provides a summary of the Gini index for income inequality of the fif- 
teen most unequal and fifteen least unequal countries around the world. The Gini  
index ranges between 0 (complete equality) and 100 (complete inequality). A country  
with equal distribution where all people receive the same amount of income would  
have a 0 Gini index. A country with completely unequal distribution of income  
would have a Gini index of 100. When using the Gini coefficient “we need to re- 
member that the index converts a whole distribution to a single number and that there  
are many different ways in which such a conversion can be made” (Atkinson 2015, p.  
17). The relevant Gini index varies between 25 and 66 as shown in Table 1, with  
more equal countries having Gini coefficients of 30.0 or below; the most unequal  
countries have Gini coefficients of 50.0 or above. We may add that the Gini index for  
US, UK, Japan and China falls in the middle of the list, with the World Bank Gini  
index being 41.1 for the US, 38.0 for the UK, 38.1 for Japan and 37.0 for China. All  
four are around the average of 38.8 Gini index. These Gini indices clearly make the  
point of inequality and the urgency for relevant economic policies around the world  
to reduce inequality. Especially so since income inequality has been rising in most  
countries around the world since the early 1980s as the OECD (2008) study demon- 
strates. A more recent study by Branko Milanović (2011, p. 8), shows that between 
  
 
Table 1 Gini Index of Fifteen Most Unequal and Fifteen Least Unequal Countries 
 
Fifteen most unequal countries Gini index (%) Fifteen least unequal countries Gini index (%) 
Seychelles  65.8 Sweden 25.0 
South Africa 65.0 Norway 25.8 
Comoros 64.3 Austria 26.0 
Namibia 61.3 Czech Republic 26.0 
Botswana 61.0 Slovakia 26.0 
Haiti 59.2 Ukraine 26.4 
Angola 58.6 Belarus 26.5 
Honduras 57.4 Finland 26.9 
Central African Republic 56.3 Serbia 27.8 
Zambia 54.6 Afghanistan 27.8 
Colombia 53.5 Denmark 28.1 
Belize 53.1 Albania 29.0 
Suriname 52.9 Kazakhstan 29.0 
Brazil 52.7 Iraq 29.5 
Lesotho 52.5 Ethiopia 29.8 
 
Source: World Bank (2015)1. 
                                                        
1 World Bank. 2015. World Bank Gini Index. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality (accessed February 15, 2015). 
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the 1980s and 2010, “the United States and the United Kingdom - and indeed most 
advanced economies - have become much richer and much more unequal. In 2010, 
real per capita income in the United States was 65 percent above its 1980s level and 
in the United Kingdom, 77 percent higher. Over the same period, inequality in the 
United States increased from about 35 to 40 … and in the United Kingdom, from 30 
to about 37 Gini points. These increases reflect significant adverse movements in 
income distributions. Overall, between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, inequality 
rose in 16 out of 20 rich OECD countries”. See, also, Nuno Crespo, Sandrina B. Mo-
reira, and Nadia Simoes (2015) for an alternative approach to measure inequality and 
some empirical evidence in the case of Portugal.  
These redistribution effects were greatly helped by attempts at financial libera-
lization in many countries around the world, especially so before the international 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. Of particular importance for our purposes was the fi-
nancial liberalization framework in the US, especially the repeal of the 1933 Glass-
Steagall Act in 1999. Both the redistribution and the financial liberalization policies 
led to a period of financial engineering in the US, namely securitisation in the form 
of what we now know as interlinked securities, based on subprime mortgages. The 
sale of the interlinked securities to international investors made the US housing bub-
ble a global problem and provided the transmission mechanism for the contagion to 
the rest of the world. The spread of the interlinked securities worldwide produced the 
international financial crisis of August 2007 and the subsequent “great recession”. In 
all these main causes of the financial and real crises there were also contributory 
ones, namely the international imbalances, the monetary policy pursued at the time 
and the role of credit rating agencies (for further details see, Arestis and Karakitsos 
2013; Arestis forthcoming). The link between financialisation - the increase in size 
and importance of unregulated financial sector, which creates a process whereby fi-
nancial markets dominate over the rest of the markets in the economy - and rising 
inequality should be emphasised. For it is true that “led by a dismantling of the con-
trols over financial flows, the finance sector has been the main component of a deci-
sive shift in the share of gross domestic product (GDP) towards capital and away 
from labour” (New Economics Foundation (NEF) 2014, p. 4). It is interesting to 
compare the period prior to the “great recession” with that of after the “great depres-
sion” in the case of the US. In the latter case, regulation of the financial sector was 
very successful in terms of producing almost four decades of financial stability and 
rapid growth. Following the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, banks focussed on lending, 
thereby providing credit as needed for the rapid expansion of the enterprise sector. 
Markets acted the way markets are supposed to function, by reducing the scope for 
risk-taking. But beginning with financial liberalisation in the mid-1970s and culmi-
nating to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in 1999 the deregulation that 
emerged led to instability (see, also, Stiglitz 2013, Chapter 6).  
Clearly rising inequality, along with financialisation, has had profound ma-
croeconomic effects; as such it plays a serious role in creating the conditions for both 
chronic and acute financial and economic instability. This is essentially so since in-
creasing inequality depresses aggregate demand given that lower income groups have 
a higher marginal propensity to income than the top income groups. There are, there-
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fore, policy implications that emerge from the analysis of this section. We thereby 
turn our attention next to the policy implications in terms of tackling the kind of in-
come inequalities we have discussed in this section. 
 
2. Economic Policy Implications 
 
2.1 Importance of Distributional Effects in Economic Policy 
 
Recent experience, as the literature reviewed above demonstrates, the distribution of 
income if not tackled can lead to crises, as the case was with the international finan-
cial crisis of 2007/2008 and real crisis of 2009, and the “great depression” of the late 
1920s. Distribution of income from wages to profits, especially to the top end and to 
the financial sector in particular, was one of the main causes of the international fi-
nancial crisis of 2007/2008 and the “great recession” that followed (Arestis and Ka-
rakitsos 2013; Arestis forthcoming). Distributional effects should be a major objec-
tive of economic policy. As we have argued in Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (2011) it 
is very important to account for “distributional effects” in both economic theory and 
policy, which have been fatally ignored. This is an important finding in view of the 
fact that “until the crisis, it is difficult to identify a period in the past 50 years when 
inequality was close to the top of the public policy or academic agenda” (Stiglitz 
2013, 2015; Andrew G. Haldane 2014). In terms of the relevant empirical evidence, 
John S. L. McCombie and Marta R. M. Spreafico (2015, p. 20) summarise it to con-
clude that “the evidence now strongly suggests that greater inequality is harmful for 
growth. This suggests that there is a case for government intervention”. John M. 
Keynes (1936) argued that the two outstanding faults of economic policy were the 
failure to secure full employment and to tackle the arbitrary and inequitable distribu-
tion of income. Reducing inequality enhances growth and with appropriate economic 
policies, as suggested below, full employment could be achieved. 
Still there is no general tendency towards attempting to achieve greater eco-
nomic equality, as others have also demonstrated (see, for a recent contribution, Pi-
ketty 2014). On the contrary, unequal distribution continues unabated. And to quote a 
relevant conclusion from an International Monetary Fund (IMF) study (Kumhof and 
Rencière 2010b, p. 31), “restoring equality by redistributing income from the rich to 
the poor would not only please the Robin Hoods of the world, but could also save the 
global economy from another major crisis” (see, also, Andrew G. Berg, Jonathan D. 
Ostry, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer 2008; Berg and Ostry 2011; Michael D. Bordo and 
Christopher M. Meissner 2012; Stiglitz 2013, 2015; Ostry, Berg, and Charalambos 
G. Tsangarides 2014). Not only has the IMF recognised the importance of reducing 
inequality but also the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the OECD (OECD 
2011; ADB 2012; Federico Cingano 2014; McCombie and Spreafico 2015). An in-
teresting and relevant finding is that of the Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides (2014) 
study, where measures of inequality at the bottom and top of the income distribution 
differ significantly. The degree of inequality at the bottom of the income distribution 
impacts negatively on growth. The degree of income inequality at the top of the dis-
tribution, however, has no significant effect on economic growth. This finding fur-
ther supports the importance of economic policy in tackling inequality. An important 
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policy implication is that “because crises are costly, redistribution policies that pre-
vent excessive household indebtedness and reduce crisis-risk ex-ante can be more 
desirable from a macrostabilization point of view than ex-post policies such as bai-
louts or debt restructurings” (Kumhof and Renciére 2010a, p. 4). But more macrosta-
bilization policies are necessary as we argue in the sub-section that follows. 
More recently, the IMF managing director and the governor of the Bank of 
England have clearly stated at a conference in London (“Inclusive Capitalism”, 27 
May 2014) that rising inequality is a threat to economic growth and financial stabili-
ty. The IMF managing director (Christine Lagarde 2014, p. 11) made the point that 
“one of the leading economic stories of our time is rising income inequality, and the 
dark shadow it casts across the global economy”. The IMF managing director went 
on to suggest that “the facts are familiar. Since 1980, the richest 1 percent increased 
their share of income in 24 out of 26 countries for which we have data. In the US, the 
share of income taken home by the top one percent more than doubled since the 
1980s, returning to where it was on the eve of the Great Depression. In the UK, 
France, and Germany, the share of private capital in national income is now back to 
levels last seen almost a century ago”.  
The Chair of the US Federal Reserve System made similar comments. At the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conference (October 2014), Janet L. Yellen (2014) 
clearly admitted that “the extent of and continuing increase in inequality in the Unit-
ed States greatly concern me. The past several decades have seen the most sustained 
rise in inequality since the 19th century after more than 40 years of narrowing in-
equality following the Great Depression”. Yellen (2014) went on to suggest that “it is 
no secret that the past few decades of widening inequality can be summed up as sig-
nificant income and wealth gains for those at the very top and stagnant living stan-
dards for the majority”. Yellen (op. cit.) showed that the average real US income of 
the top 5 percent of households grew by 38 percent from 1989 to 2013. The average 
real income of the other 95 percent of households grew less than 10 percent. In terms 
of the wealth distribution, the wealthiest 5 percent of US households held 54 percent 
of all wealth in 1989, and reached 63 percent in 2013. The rest of those in the top 
half of the wealth distribution held 43 percent of wealth in 1989 and only 36 percent 
in 2013. The lower half of households’ wealth was just 3 percent in 1989 and only 1 
percent in 2013. 
In terms of the contributory factors to inequality Atkinson (2015, p. 82) sum-
marises them as follows: “globalisation, technological change (information and 
communications technology), growth of financial services; changing pay norms, re-
duced role of trade unions; scaling back of the redistributive tax-and-transfer policy”. 
Tali Kristal and Yinon Cohen (2015) provide empirical evidence, based on 43 US 
private non-agricultural industries between 1969 and 2007, which suggests that “the 
erosion of pay-setting institutions, mainly unionization and the real minimum wage, 
explains about 50 percent of rising wage inequality in U.S. private industries between 
1969 and 2007, while the spread of computer technology explains 12-14 percent be-
tween 1969 and 1997 and 21-24 percent between 1988 and 2007”. It is also the case 
that “similar results showing a larger effect of de-unionization (vs. computerization) 
on inequality were found in Germany (Joe King 2013), as well as in a study on 22 
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developed countries (OECD 2011)” (Kristal and Cohen op. cit., p. 37). Furthermore, 
Davide Furceri and Prakash Loungani (2013, p. 25) suggest two further explanations 
of the increased inequality. “The first is the opening up of capital markets to foreign 
entry and competition, referred to as capital account liberalization. The second 
source is policy actions by governments to lower their budget deficits. Such actions 
are referred to as fiscal consolidation in economists’ jargon and, by their critics, as 
‘austerity’ policies”. Furceri and Loungani (2013, p. 26) refer to 58 episodes of large-
scale capital account reforms in 17 advanced economies to conclude that “on aver-
age, capital account liberalization is followed by a significant and persistent increase 
in inequality. The Gini coefficient increases by about 1 percent a year after liberaliza-
tion and by 2 percent after five years”. It is also argued by Furceri and Loungani (op. 
cit., pp. 26-27) that “over the past 30 years, there were 173 episodes of fiscal consol-
idation in our sample of 17 advanced economies. On average across these episodes, 
policy actions reduced the budget deficit by about 1 percent of GDP. There is clear 
evidence that the decline in budget deficits was followed by increases in inequality. 
The Gini coefficient increased by 2 percentage points two years following the fiscal 
consolidation and by nearly 1 percentage point after eight years”. 
It is indeed the case, then, that inequality needs to be tackled for it has grown 
to where it can no longer be ignored as Stiglitz (2013, 2015) has also suggested. 
 
2.2 Economic Policies to Tackle Inequality 
 
2.2.1 Wage-Led or Profit-Led Demand  
 
The propositions as discussed above are further supported by findings that confirm a 
significant decline in the wage share in both the developed and developing worlds 
(see, for example, Onaran and Galanis 2014). In discussing how such changes in in-
come inequality affect economic growth, the distinction between “wage-led” and 
“profit-led” regimes is adopted.  A wage-led regime is one where a shift in income 
towards wages results in higher growth, while a profit-led regime is one where a shift 
in income towards profits lowers income. This is so, of course, since in a profit-led 
regime the positive impact of higher profit share on investment and net exports ex-
ceeds the negative impact on domestic consumption, while the opposite is true in a 
wage-led regime. Consequently, a redistribution of income to profits results in higher 
saving rates and as a result, a reduction in consumption. There are two demand ef-
fects in place: the domestic-demand effect, which captures the impact of changes in 
distribution on consumption and investment; and the open-economy effect, which 
accounts for the impact on net exports. Rising wage shares are expected to have a 
positive effect on consumption (in view of the higher marginal propensity to con-
sume out of wage income in relation to that out of profit income), but negative effect 
on investment (in view of falling profits) and net exports (in view of the sensitivity of 
net exports to unit labour cost). 
Onaran and Galanis (op. cit.) go a step further to argue that there are suppor-
tive relevant empirical findings. Onaran and Galanis (op. cit.) clearly state that the 
relevant empirical evidence is based on the examination of the effect of income dis-
tribution on growth in 16 large developed and developing countries, with the 16 
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countries comprising more than 80 percent of the global GDP; this is undertaken for 
the period 1960-2007 for developed countries and 1970-2007 for developing coun-
tries (in the case of China the period is 1978-2007). This empirical evidence estab-
lishes that in most of the major advanced economies there is a wage-led demand re-
gime. Canada and Australia are two exceptions where a profit-led regime is con-
firmed. The empirical evidence provided by Onaran and Galanis (op. cit.) suggests 
that a 1 percentage point simultaneous decline in the wage share of the 16 countries 
in their empirical sample, leads to a decline in global GDP by 0.36 percentage points. 
Also if all wage-led countries were to return to their, for example, late 1970s wage 
share levels, along with a more modest increase in the wage share in the profit-led 
countries global GDP, would increase by 3.05 percentage points; in such a scenario 
GDP increases in all individual G20 countries. It is also shown by Onaran and Gala-
nis (2014) that demand is wage-led not only in the majority of the developed econo-
mies in G20 but also in some emerging market economies in this group such as Tur-
key and Korea in isolation. When the external sector is included in the form of for-
eign trade and globalisation effects, aggregate demand remains wage-led in most of 
the developed G20. 
This empirical evidence implies three important conclusions that support the 
proposition of implementing economic policies to tackle the significant inequality 
over the period of empirical investigation of Onaran and Galanis (2013, 2014). 
“First, domestic private demand (that is the sum of consumption and investment) is 
wage-led in all countries … Second, foreign trade forms only a small part of aggre-
gate demand in large countries … Similarly, if countries, which have strong trade 
relations with each other … are considered as an aggregate economic area, the pri-
vate demand regime is wage-led. Finally, the most novel finding is that even if there 
are some countries, which are profit-led, the global economy is wage-led. Thus, a 
simultaneous wage cut in a highly integrated global economy leaves most countries 
with only the negative domestic demand effects, and the global economy contracts. 
Furthermore most profit-led countries contract when they decrease their wage share, 
if a similar strategy is implemented also by their trading partners” (Onaran and Gala-
nis 2013, p. 87). Onaran and Thomas Obst (2015) examine empirically a simultane-
ous increase in the wage share in 15 countries of the European Union, which leads to 
an increase in growth. They show that a 1% increase in the wage share would lead to 
a 0.30% increase in the GDP of the 15 European countries. 11 of these countries are 
wage-led and 4 are profit-led, when the 15 countries are examined in isolation.  
It is the case then that a higher wage share can have expansionary effects as 
the Keynesian tradition has long asserted. Since wages is the main source of income 
for most households, higher wages feed into higher consumption. It is also true that 
low income households have a higher marginal propensity to consume than high in-
come households. As a result low income households spend a higher share of their 
income. It clearly is the case, then, that pro-capital redistribution of income is 
detrimental to growth. By contrast, “a wage-led strategy … will generate a much 
more stable growth regime for the future” (Marc Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013, pp. 
13-14). This is of course particularly important in view of the 2007/2008 internation-
al financial crisis and the subsequent “great recession”, which have weakened the 
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power of labour to defend nominal and real wages (see, also, Hein and Mundt 2013). 
It is also the case that in large economic areas, like the euro one, where wage-growth 
is the order, wage-led recovery policies, instead of wage moderation, can improve 
growth and employment. In more general terms, a global wage-led recovery through 
a significant increase in wage share can lead to an increase in global growth. Such 
policy would also help to reduce the danger of another global financial crisis by 
reducing inequality - one of the main causes of the international financial crisis of 
2007/2008 (see, also, Arestis forthcoming). 
Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013, p. 26) examine the case of “supply effects” 
in addition to “demand effects” to conclude that changes in functional income distri-
bution have supply-side effects in addition to demand-side effects. The authors argue 
that the “summary variable for the supply side is labour productivity”, and as such it 
is a wage-led partial productivity regime. Available empirical evidence suggests that 
higher wage growth induces higher productivity growth, as for example the study by 
Hein and Arthur Tarassow (2010). The latter study provides evidence in six OECD 
countries, over the period 1960-2007, to show that faster real wage growth leads to 
higher productivity growth. Similarly, Servaas Storm and C. W. M. Naastepad (2013, 
p. 103) suggest that this positive “supply-side” relationship, whereby real wage 
growth affects labour productivity growth can be explained in two ways: “by de-
pressing the growth of aggregate demand, real wage growth restraint reduces produc-
tivity growth” and “directly, by retarding the rate of labour-saving technological 
progress, because lower wage growth reduces firm’s incentives to invest in labour-
saving R&D”. The same authors provide a short review of the empirical evidence on 
this score, which suggests that in terms of the causal link from demand growth to 
productivity growth it is 0.46 for the group of the OECD countries. A one percentage 
point change in demand growth is associated with a 0.46 percentage change in labour 
productivity growth. In terms of the relationship between real wage growth and 
productivity growth for the same group of countries, the relevant coefficient is 0.38, 
so that a one percentage change in real wage growth is associated with 0.38 percen-
tage change in productivity growth.      
The Economist (2014) supports the argument that redistributing income more 
equally does help to increase aggregate demand. Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides (2014, 
pp. 25-26) provide evidence on the relationship between inequality, redistribution 
and growth to conclude that “first, inequality continues to be a robust and powerful 
determinant both of the pace of medium-term growth and of the duration of growth 
spells, even controlling for the size of redistributive transfers ... And second, there is 
surprisingly little evidence for the growth-destroying effects of fiscal redistribution at 
a macroeconomic level”. Such a strategy should be complemented by fiscal and 
moneatry policies, along with proper co-ordination of them, as we argue in Arestis 
(2015) and further discussed below. The objective should be full employment. Fiscal 
policy in particular is an important dimension in this regard. The study by Leonel 
Muinelo-Gallo and Oriol Roca-Sagalés (2011) employs an endogenous growth mod-
el that incorporates fiscal policy and economic growth along with their effects on 
income inequality. Pooled-panel estimations are undertaken for 43 upper-middle and 
high-income countries for the period 1972-2006 to conclude that increases in public 
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investment expenditure reduce inequality without harming output, regardless of 
whether they are financed through direct or indirect taxes.  
The policy implications just discussed are further supported by the ILO (2008) 
study that provides evidence to show that it is possible to avoid excessive income 
inequality while achieving a high employment rate. This is the case for both high and 
medium/low per capita GDP countries. Examples provided by the ILO (op. cit.) 
study among high per capita GDP countries, where employment rates are high and 
income inequalities relatively low, like Austria, Australia, the Nordics and Switzer-
land, have managed well on this score. Wage share has fallen in these countries too; 
however they seem to be able to use welfare state to counter the impact of market 
(pre) distribution. These countries “are characterized by relatively strong, employ-
ment-oriented social protection, higher than average coverage of collective agree-
ments and well-respected political rights” (ILO 2008, p. 156). Examples among me-
dium and low per capita GDP are countries, like the Czech Republic and Uruguay, 
where relatively high employment is accompanied by limited income inequalities. It 
is suggested that these countries are also “associated with relatively developed social 
protection, stronger tripartite institutions than in other countries, and observance of 
political rights” (ILO op. cit., p. 6). It is then clear that pro-labour distributional 
policies that promote wage policies, strengthening the welfare state and the power of 
the labour unions via improving the status of labour unions through changing union 
legislation to foster collective bargaining, and establishing sufficiently high 
minimum wages, are important economic policy ingredients. It is interesting to note 
that US union membership -- the percent of wage and salary workers who were 
members of unions -- declined from 20.1 percent of wage - and salary - earnings of 
workers in 1983 (the first year for which comparable union data are available) to 
11.9 percent in 2010. In 2014, the union membership rate was 11.1 percent, down 0.2 
percentage point from 2013 (Stiglitz 2013; US Bureau of Labour Statistics, 23 Janu-
ary, 2015). Similar trends prevail in many other countries.  
Another relevant study that strongly supports these economic policies is the 
study by Stockhammer (2013, p. 63), where it is also argued that in addition to these 
ingedients financialisation is confirmed “as the single most important cause for the 
decline in the wage share” in view of the deregulation of the financial system and the 
rising prominance of the financial institutions not only in the US but in other 
countries as well. Financialisation further includes “the rising indebtness of 
households, more volatile exchange rates and asset prices, short-termism of financial 
institutions, and shareholder value orientation of non-financial business” 
(Stockhammer op. cit., p. 47). Social institutions and the structure of the financial 
system are thereby important ingredients of income distribution. Clearly then, in 
addition to the above discussed distributional policies, financial regulation is a 
further important and relevant policy ingedient (see, also, Stockhammer op. cit.). 
 
2.2.2 Further Economic Policies to Tackle Inequality 
 
The ILO (ILO 2008, Chapter 4) study examines the extent to which taxes and social 
transfers can be a powerful redistributive mechanism. While it is argued that this 
could be the case, the evidence shows that despite increasing income inequality this 
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redistributive mechanism has not been successful. The main reason for this “is that 
taxation has become less progressive and therefore less likely to address the growing 
income inequality found in the majority of ILO member states” (ILO 2008, p. 127). 
Another factor suggested by the ILO (op. cit.) study is that the “weaker progressivi-
ty” of the tax system has not been offset by relevant social transfers to enable redi-
stributive effects. This does not mean that taxes and social transfers cannot address 
income inequality; policy makers should make sure that relevant policies are applied 
properly so that they are effective. 
Reforming taxes to make them fairer and more effective is, therefore, an 
important aspect of fiscal policy. Indeed, Berg and Ostry (2011) show that a redistri-
butive tax system is associated with higher and durable economic growth. Anton Ko-
rinek and Jonathan Kreamer (2013, p. 6) advocate redistributive policies “such as 
higher taxes on financial sector profits that are used to strengthen the social safety net 
of the economy would constitute such a mechanism”. Raising the minimum wage 
and indexing it to inflation is another important tool to fight inequality (see, for 
example, The Economist 2014). A further example, and priority, is the removal of 
subsidies for the “too-big-to-fail” financial insitutions (see, also, The Economist 
2012). Such a policy initiative would help to remove, to a large extent, one of the 
main contributory factors to the surge in wealth at the top of income distribution and 
to the financial sector in particular.  
A recovery led by domestic demand and increase in the wage share in the 
global economy would help to reverse the major factor of inequality behind the glob-
al crisis. Gains in competitiveness can and should be achieved through productivity 
increases rather than wage reductions and weak labour conditions. In this sense 
strong trade unions, collective bargaining and high minimum wages are beneficial. 
All this would ensure that wage growth catches up with productivity growth, and 
hence consumption growth strengthens output growth. More generally speaking, the 
state should be able to reduce inequality through progressive taxation and public ex-
penditure policies. There is, of course, the argument that fiscal policy is ineffective in 
view of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. As argued in Arestis (2012, 2015), 
where further and relevant references are provided, such arguments lack theoretical 
and empirical credence (see, also, Arestis 2011; Arestis and Ana R. Gonzalez-
Martinez 2015). 
These policies would tax the top more than the rest, and through the orienta-
tion of social expenditure towards the low income households. By contrast, pro-
grammes that give away a country’s resources to the rich and well connected can 
increase inequality. A good example of the latter case is the enormous decrease of 
the progressivity of the income tax in the US and UK since 1980, which “probably 
explains much of the increase in the very highest earned income” (Piketty 2015, pp. 
495-496). It is interesting to note that both the US and UK were among the main 
proponents of progressive taxation after World War II; but of course not so more 
recently. Progressive taxation in the US was evident between 1933 and mid-1960s 
when the top tax rate stabilised at 90 percent, but fell to 70 percent in the early 
1980s. Between 1933 and 1980 the top federal income tax rate averaged 81 percent. 
In the UK case the top rate for unearned income (income from capital) was 98 per-
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cent from 1941 to 1952 and again from 1974 to 1978. The top rate for earned income 
(income from labour) was slightly lower; for example, between 1974 and 1978 it was 
83 percent. It is also the case that the US and UK tax rates fell from 80-90 percent in 
1933-1980 to 30-40 percent in 1980-2010 (with a low tax point of 28 percent in the 
US as a result of the then President’s tax reform in 1986). All these examples and 
percentages are from Piketty (2015, pp. 507-512). 
We should not forget the required reduction of the enormously high pay of top 
executives and financiers, which reached the public agenda with the emergence of 
the global 2007/2008 financial crisis. Indeed, the immense accumulation of income 
and wealth in the financial sector, as shown above in Section 1, should not be ac-
companied by austerity measures. It should, instead, be tackled by raising taxes on 
upper-income holders and cutting war expenditure (James Crotty 2011, for example). 
The IMF (2014) relevant study suggests that there is growing evidence that high in-
come inequality has increased in recent decades in both developed and developing 
countries (as well as emerging), and has been detrimental to macroeconomic stability 
and growth. It is thereby of paramount importance for governments to employ fiscal 
policy to influence income distribution. Fiscal policy, it is argued, is the primary tool 
for governments to affect income distribution and thereby inequality. This should be 
undertaken through both tax and spending policies. As for specific guidance on the 
use of fiscal policy for redistribution, this, it is suggested, is a country-specific prob-
lem. 
Piketty (2014) deals with the rise of inequality over the past forty year or so, 
and suggests that increases in inequality are due to the return on capital (r) exceeding 
the economic growth rate of the economy (g). This emerges in view of increased sav-
ings generated by the high rate of return on capital, causing capital and wealth to 
grow faster than the growth of the economy. As a result capital income grows, as a 
share of total income, since the rate of return does not fall sufficiently fast with capi-
tal deepening. Piketty (2015, p. 48) goes further to suggest that “institutional changes 
and political shocks - which to a large extent can be viewed as endogenous to the 
inequality and development process itself - played a major role in the past, and it will 
probably be the same in the future”. Piketty (2014) argues that with such substantial 
income inequality worldwide, restoration of high marginal tax rates is in order. Gre-
gory N. Mankiw (2015, p. 43), though, asks the question “Yes, r > g. So what?”. The 
arguments is that in neoclassical economics r > g is not a problem, while r < g “could 
be”. Mankiw (op. cit., p. 46), therefore, believes “that wealth inequality is not a prob-
lem”; on the contrary, a global tax on capital would lower everybody’s standard of 
living. 
Most important, though, for Piketty (op. cit., pp. 516-517), is the imposition of 
a progressive global tax on capital, “that is a tax on the net value of assets each per-
son controls”, which should be “a progressive annual tax on global wealth. The larg-
est fortunes are to be taxed more heavily, and all types of assets are to be included: 
real estate, financial assets, and business assets - no exceptions”. Such a proposition, 
it is argued, would offer the best option for keeping inequality under control, and 
such a tax is “by far less dangerous than the alternatives” (Piketty op. cit., p. 516). 
Still, though, it is suggested that capital, income, and inheritance taxes play “useful 
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and complementary” (Piketty op. cit., p. 547) roles. It is also argued that a global tax 
on capital can impose effective regulation on the financial and banking system, 
which helps to avoid crises. Piketty (2014, p. 526) argues that a tax on capital is an 
incentive to seek the best return on capital. Indeed, and given that the top capital 
owners earn very high returns, clearly suggests that this “argument is the most impor-
tant justification of a progressive tax on capital”.  
Those with low incomes would pay little, while those who have billions would 
pay a great deal more. Such tax would require international co-operation of course, 
and as such, Piketty (2014, p. 515) admits, “it is a utopian idea”, but “it is neverthe-
less useful” at the same time. The usefulness of such a tax relies on the proposition 
that it “can serve as a worthwhile reference point, a standard against which alterna-
tive proposals can be measured”. Still, and although implementing such a tax would 
be a serious challenge politically, Piketty (op. cit., p. 471) suggests that if the Euro-
pean Union and the US supported such a tax, it would be a great beginning. It is fur-
ther suggested that “short of that, a regional or continental tax might be tried, in par-
ticular in Europe, starting with countries willing to accept such a tax” (Peter Di-
amond and Saez 2011; Piketty, Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva 2014). It is also sug-
gested that “such a tax would also have another virtue: it would expose wealth to 
democratic scrutiny, which is a necessary condition for effective regulation of the 
banking system and international capital flows (Piketty 2014, p. 471). Foster and 
Yates (2014) argue that when Piketty (2014) “presented a theoretical perspective that 
challenged the primary approach to questions of income and wealth distribution pre-
viously held to by almost all neoclassical economists, the result was explosive. Sud-
denly there was a work on growing inequality that had the imprimatur of the estab-
lishment … and could not be easily dismissed ad hominem as the work of a ‘non-
scientific’ heterodox economist. If not exactly a revolution against neoclassical eco-
nomics, the contents of his book had all the looks of a palace coup” (Foster and 
Yates 2014, p. 5).  
A contribution by Olivier Bargain et al. (2015), attempts to answer the ques-
tion of whether it is economic policy or other factors that caused inequality in the US 
over the period 1979-2007. The study deals with the impact of tax policy on post-tax 
income inequality, by focusing on pre- and post-tax income inequality. The authors 
suggest that their contribution “can be seen as a natural follow-up of the study by 
Piketty and Saez (2007) who analyze changes in the progressivity of the federal in-
come tax over time but cannot disentangle policy changes from other factors” (Bar-
gain et al. 2015, p. 1062). The main conclusion of Bargain et al. (op. cit., p. 1080) is 
that “over the whole sample period, tax policy aggravated the trend of growing in-
equality in pretax incomes: tax policy had a positive (negative) effect on the income 
share of taxpayers above (below) the 80th percentile … A second key result is that the 
policy effect … was largest for taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentiles but smallest 
for those in the top 1% … In addition, accounting for indirect policy effects due to 
behavioral responses does not change our results qualitatively, but raises the relative 
importance of the policy effect on inequality: the upper bound estimate for the total 
policy effect is 18%-41% (depending on the inequality measure) of the total change. 
The analysis also suggests that tax reforms in the 1980s and early 2000s exacerbated 
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trends of growing inequality while those in the early 1990s benefited low-income 
taxpayers”. The taxes implemented and examined over the period of investigation 
were federal and state level income taxes and payroll taxes, as well as tax credits. 
The tax reforms implemented over the period under investigation are not of the pro-
gressive-taxation type and certainly no orientation of social expenditure towards the 
low income households was in place. The taxes implemented over the period under 
investigation are not of the type that would deal with the question of appropriate tax 
policies affecting causally inequality. It is the case that the authors admit that the re-
sults of the study “should be interpreted as association rather than causation” (Bar-
gain et al. op. cit., p. 1066). 
Atkinson (2015) is clear on the harm of inequality. It undermines economic 
growth and social cohesion. According to Atkinson (op. cit.) the use of the old redi-
stributive tools with more vigour is the best way forward to tackle the “Inequality 
Turn” in the years since around 1980. The main suggestion is progressive taxation. 
This argument is based on the idea that “a more progressive structure for the personal 
income tax” (Atkinson op. cit., p. 290) should be introduced. In the case of the UK, 
for example, the current top rate of tax (45 percent) should be levied at a lower level 
of income (£55,000 is suggested) with a new 55 percent when taxable income reach-
es $100,000 and also a new 65 percent top rate for those earning more than £200,000. 
Atkinson (2015, p. 187) states that “the UK has had a top income tax of 65 percent or 
higher for half of the past 100 years”. 
It is also proposed that an “Earned Income Discount” should be introduced, 
aiming at not raising the tax rate on low levels of earnings (and pensions) as a result 
of the implementation of the progressive tax structure. Atkinson (op. cit., p. 205) also 
argues for renewal of “social security for all” in view of the fact that “one reason for 
rising austerity in recent decades has been the scaling back of social protection at a 
time when needs are growing, not shrinking”; indeed, it is the case that “the welfare 
state has in the past played a major role in reducing inequality”. It is further sug-
gested that radical reform of inheritance taxation, modernisation of property taxation, 
a wealth tax, and a global taxation are important ingredients. It is also argued that 
policy-makers should be concerned with tackling unemployment. An unemployment 
target of 2 percent is suggested along with the government acting as “an employer of 
last resort”, thereby introducing guaranteed public employment. It is also proposed 
the introduction of a national pay and social policy, under the aegis of a Social and 
Economic Council involving trade unions, other social partners and nongovernmental 
bodies, and establishing a substantially higher statutory minimum wage. “Technolo-
gical change” in a way that increases the “employability of workers” (through fund-
ing of scientific research), a more secure legal framework for trade unions, more 
comprehensive taxation of inheritance and property tax, and expansion of universal 
benefits are further proposals. All these measures should produce a more equitable 
income distribution. Atkinson (2015) goes a step further to suggest that economic 
policies to reduce inequality in the OECD countries as a whole, or in the European 
Union as a whole, are possible. Although Atkinson (op. cit.) recognises the difficul-
ties of pursuing such a path, the suggested relevant proposals can be introduced on 
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the basis of cooperation and coordination of economic policies of the group of coun-
tries concerned.   
We would agree with Atkinson (2015) that it is of paramount importance to 
have in place proper distributional policies along with wage policies if a viable 
growth regime is to emerge and be sustained. We would go a step further, though, 
and argue that to reduce inequality significantly as Atkinson (2015) and, also, Arestis 
and Sawyer (2013) propose, proper coordination of monetary and fiscal policies 
along with financial stability would be the best way forward (see, also, Arestis 2012, 
2015). The ECB President (Mario Draghi 2015) warned central banks of the dangers 
of aggressive monetary easing, including mass bond buying, which might lead to 
financial instability and thereby worsen income inequality. Draghi (op. cit.) suggests 
that distributional consequences may arise from “very low rates for a prolonged pe-
riod”, which “might penalise savers to the benefit of debtors”; also “rising asset pric-
es as a consequence of our purchases might benefit the wealthy disproportionately 
and thereby increase inequality”. It is the case actually that monetary easing in both 
the US and the UK has had the effect Draghi (2015) referred to in that it has not 
helped much in terms of what it was intended to achieve. It has instead promoted the 
stock markets and the estate markets in terms of enormous increase in their relevant 
prices, both of which increase inequality. 
Monetary and fiscal policies should be directed at reducing inequality through 
appropriate expenditure and progressive tax policies, which should be supported by 
monetary policy. The latter should be concerned with reforms in an attempt to regu-
late and avoid the type of financial architecture that led to the 2007/2008 internation-
al financial crisis. Such regulation had been neglected prior to the international fi-
nancial crisis of 2007/2008. The regime of inflation targeting under the auspices of 
an independent central bank, and the neglect of proper regulation of the financial 
system has not worked as efficiently as the proponents had expected, as many au-
thors have demonstrated (see, for example, Alvaro Angeriz and Arestis 2008; Ange-
riz, Arestis, and McCombie 2008; Stiglitz 2013, Chapter 9). Inflation targeting also 
neglects distributional effects in view of its central assumption of the representative 
agent and its emphasis on inflation as the single target of economic policy, thereby 
neglecting unemployment.  
This concern should particularly be with respect to prudential regulation and 
financial supervision. The role of monetary policy in promoting employment creation 
is another objective that needs to be properly implemented. Manipulation of the rate 
of interest by the central bank to keep the real interest rate below the productivity 
growth would have stimulating effects on aggregate demand (Hein and Mundt 2013). 
Such a monetary policy should be implemented in coordination with fiscal policy. At 
the same time, financial stability policies are necessary to avoid sharp and unsustain-
able increases in debt-to-income ratios among lower-and middle income households 
thereby containing the leverage ratio and the risks of crises like the 2007/2008 inter-
national financial and real crisis. At the end of the day, crises can be avoided if econ-
omies are well managed and financial markets are sufficiently regulated. Since the 
international financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the “great recession” a number of fi-
nancial reforms have been proposed (see, for example, Arestis and Karakitsos 2013). 
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However, it is over five years since the US Dodd-Frank Act of July 2010, and other 
subsequent proposed financial reforms, like the UK Vickers Report and the similar 
one in Europe, the Basle Committee Banking Regulations, were proposed, but the 
news is not encouraging since financial reforms remain a work in progress across the 
world. And as the Managing Director of the IMF, argued at a conference in London 
(27 May, 2014) “progress is still too slow, and the finish line is still too far off”. 
Another relevant suggestion is the introduction and implementation of a financial 
transactions tax, which should cover both spot and derivative assets. The purpose of 
such tax should be to curb speculation and raise substantial funds for public invest-
ment (see, for example, Arestis and Sawyer 2013; Stephanie Seguino 2014).  
It is also important to remember that an increased and progressive tax burden 
on the remuneration of rentier capitalists and top professionals will not make capital-
ism just, but it will reduce its intrinsic injustice. In all these, pro-labour policies are 
vital as argued above. Such policies are the following: strengthening the welfare 
state, labour unions and labour market institutions, collective bargaining as well as 
improving union legislation and strengthening trade unions. Increased unemployment 
benefits, higher minimum wages, and real wage growth in line with labour productiv-
ity are further policies that could help to reduce inequality. Indeed and only when 
wages grow with productivity growth will consumption expenditure grow without 
raising debt levels to unsustainable levels that can trigger serious crises. We would 
also suggest that capping high pay and education policies are further examples that 
can help redistributive effects. In terms of investment in education, this can exert a 
significant redistributive effect; this effect can materialise through the creation of 
relevant opportunities for enhancing employment (see, for example, the view of the 
ILO 2008, on education). It is also true that, and as Atkinson (2015) notes, there is a 
chance of a change in attitude on inequality for in the past, not just in wartime, sig-
nificant reductions in inequality were achieved; and history can, and does, teach us a 
great deal. 
 
3. Summary and Conclusions 
 
We have discussed inequality in a number of countries around the world but have 
emphasised the US case in view of the significance of this aspect as one of the main 
causes of the 2007/2008 international financial and real crises. The focus of this con-
tribution, though, is on economic policies to tackle inequality. We have concluded 
that such economic policies should be coordination of fiscal and monetary policies 
along with financial stability type of policies, without forgetting pro-labour distribu-
tional policies.  
In terms of whether relevant economic policies have been initiated for this 
purpose, the answer is very disappointing; not much, if any, relevant policy at all has 
been undertaken. Indeed, and all this is happening when “the ongoing global eco-
nomic slowdown is affecting low-income groups disproportionately”; and “this de-
velopment comes after a long expansionary phase where income inequality was al-
ready on the rise in the majority of countries” (ILO 2008, p. 1).  
A further and interesting question is whether it is likely that relevant economic 
policies will be pursued to reduce inequality. Unfortunately tackling unequal distri-
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bution is an area where very little progress, if any and as suggested above, has been 
undertaken; and it is highly unlikely to materialize in view of the undue political in-
fluence of the top 1% influential group in the political system. And as Stiglitz (2013, 
Chapter 9) notes, while policymakers should be aware of the inequality problems and 
act appropriately, very rarely do they respond, if at all. Also, Atkinson (2015) sug-
gests that the influence of the upper class on government policy in their attempt to 
protect their wealth is an important factor on this score. A relevant survey on this 
score is provided by Adam Bonica et al. (2013) that supports this contention. It is 
true, nonetheless, that perceptions that the existing distribution of income is not fair 
are growing, which may very well have a positive and relevant impact on the rele-
vant thinking of the top 1% influential group. 
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